<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Root of Trust on Deevnet IoTaaS</title><link>https://deevnet.github.io/deevnet-docs/docs/runbook/root-of-trust/</link><description>Recent content in Root of Trust on Deevnet IoTaaS</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://deevnet.github.io/deevnet-docs/docs/runbook/root-of-trust/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Root and Site CA Ceremony</title><link>https://deevnet.github.io/deevnet-docs/docs/runbook/root-of-trust/ceremony/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://deevnet.github.io/deevnet-docs/docs/runbook/root-of-trust/ceremony/</guid><description>&lt;h1 id="root-and-site-ca-ceremony">
 Root and Site CA Ceremony
 &lt;a class="anchor" href="#root-and-site-ca-ceremony">#&lt;/a>
&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>The Deevnet Root CA and each site&amp;rsquo;s Site CA are made in a &lt;strong>ceremony&lt;/strong>: a rare, deliberate session
on an &lt;strong>offline machine&lt;/strong>, a computer with no network, so a key it touches can only leave on the
drives you carry away. On the &lt;code>pi-pki&lt;/code> image a script, &lt;code>./deevnet-pki-ceremony.sh&lt;/code>, walks the whole
session step by step and asks before each step. This page is what you need, how to start, what the
script does, and the commands it runs.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Issuing CA</title><link>https://deevnet.github.io/deevnet-docs/docs/runbook/root-of-trust/issuing-ca/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://deevnet.github.io/deevnet-docs/docs/runbook/root-of-trust/issuing-ca/</guid><description>&lt;h1 id="issuing-ca">
 Issuing CA
 &lt;a class="anchor" href="#issuing-ca">#&lt;/a>
&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>A site&amp;rsquo;s certificates are issued by three &lt;strong>issuing CAs&lt;/strong> under its Site CA, each signed in this
ceremony:&lt;/p>
&lt;table>
 &lt;thead>
 &lt;tr>
 &lt;th>Issuing CA&lt;/th>
 &lt;th>Its key lives in&lt;/th>
 &lt;th>Issues&lt;/th>
 &lt;/tr>
 &lt;/thead>
 &lt;tbody>
 &lt;tr>
 &lt;td>Deevnet Mobile Substrate CA&lt;/td>
 &lt;td>site automation, which signs on the control node&lt;/td>
 &lt;td>every substrate certificate: hosts, appliances, service VMs and their services, the secret store&amp;rsquo;s own listener&lt;/td>
 &lt;/tr>
 &lt;tr>
 &lt;td>Deevnet Mobile Tenant Device CA&lt;/td>
 &lt;td>the secret store, behind the Deevnet API&lt;/td>
 &lt;td>tenant devices&amp;rsquo; client certificates (mTLS)&lt;/td>
 &lt;/tr>
 &lt;tr>
 &lt;td>Deevnet Mobile Tenant Service CA&lt;/td>
 &lt;td>the secret store, behind the Deevnet API&lt;/td>
 &lt;td>server certificates for tenants&amp;rsquo; own services, for names in a tenant&amp;rsquo;s own zone&lt;/td>
 &lt;/tr>
 &lt;/tbody>
&lt;/table>
&lt;p>Each is valid for five years. &lt;strong>Its key is generated where it lives,&lt;/strong> and only its signing request
comes to the ceremony. The Site CA&amp;rsquo;s holder never sees an issuing CA&amp;rsquo;s key, and the issuing CA&amp;rsquo;s
system never sees the Site CA&amp;rsquo;s.&lt;/p></description></item><item><title>Custody</title><link>https://deevnet.github.io/deevnet-docs/docs/runbook/root-of-trust/custody/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://deevnet.github.io/deevnet-docs/docs/runbook/root-of-trust/custody/</guid><description>&lt;h1 id="custody">
 Custody
 &lt;a class="anchor" href="#custody">#&lt;/a>
&lt;/h1>
&lt;p>The Root CA&amp;rsquo;s and every Site CA&amp;rsquo;s keys exist only as passphrase-encrypted files on two encrypted key
drives, kept apart. Both passphrases, the drives&amp;rsquo; and the key files&amp;rsquo;, are kept offline, under the
holder&amp;rsquo;s own control, and never with the key media.&lt;/p>
&lt;h2 id="two-key-media">
 Two key media
 &lt;a class="anchor" href="#two-key-media">#&lt;/a>
&lt;/h2>
&lt;p>&lt;strong>The keys live on two key media, kept apart:&lt;/strong>&lt;/p>
&lt;ul>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Primary key media:&lt;/strong> in the holder&amp;rsquo;s secure storage.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>Backup key media:&lt;/strong> somewhere else, so one loss (fire, theft, a bag left behind) cannot take both.&lt;/li>
&lt;li>&lt;strong>The paper record:&lt;/strong> fingerprints and dates of every certificate the ceremonies made. It is how
you recognize the right file, and how anyone checks a certificate they were handed.&lt;/li>
&lt;/ul>
&lt;p>Neither key media is ever plugged into a networked machine.&lt;/p></description></item></channel></rss>