Network Segmentation

Network Segmentation #

Defines mandatory requirements for network segmentation in Deevnet sites.


Purpose #

This standard establishes rules for how sites implement network segmentation. It complements the Substrate Networking architecture document, which describes the segment model and design rationale.


Definitions #

TermDefinition
SegmentAn isolated broadcast domain (VLAN) with controlled routing to other segments
Trust boundaryThe point where traffic policy changes between segments
Inter-segment trafficNetwork communication that crosses segment boundaries
Segment authorityThe system responsible for segment routing and policy (core router in production)

Segment Requirements #

1. Management Segment #

The management segment contains infrastructure management plane systems.

  • Management segment MUST exist in every site
  • Management segment MUST contain the bootstrap/provisioner node
  • Management segment SHOULD contain dedicated hypervisor management interfaces when hardware supports it
  • Single-NIC hypervisors SHOULD use VLAN trunking or firewall rules to isolate management access
  • Management segment MUST NOT contain end-user workloads or personal devices
  • Management segment SHOULD contain IPMI/BMC interfaces
  • Hosts in management segment MUST use -mgmt suffix for interface DNS entries (e.g., hv01-mgmt.dvntm.deevnet.net)

2. Trusted Segment #

The trusted segment contains high-trust user devices that require broad network access.

  • Trusted segment SHOULD exist when user workstations need elevated access beyond tenant segments
  • Trusted segment MUST contain only known, managed devices
  • Trusted segment MAY access management services for administration purposes
  • Trusted segment MUST NOT contain infrastructure management plane systems (those belong in management)
  • Trusted segment SHOULD have endpoint security requirements (e.g., disk encryption, managed updates)
  • Trusted segment MAY access storage segment for user data access
  • Devices in trusted segment SHOULD be authenticated users with known identities

3. Storage Segment #

The storage segment isolates storage protocol traffic.

  • Storage segment SHOULD exist when dedicated storage traffic is needed
  • Storage segment MAY be omitted in minimal sites
  • Storage segment MUST NOT carry non-storage traffic
  • Hosts in storage segment MUST use -stor suffix for interface DNS entries (e.g., hv01-stor.dvntm.deevnet.net)
  • Storage segment MAY use jumbo frames when all participants support them

4. Tenant Segments #

Tenant segments provide workload isolation per tenant namespace.

  • Each tenant MUST have its own dedicated segment
  • Tenant segments MUST be isolated from each other by default
  • Tenant segments MUST NOT have direct access to management segment
  • Tenant segments MAY access shared services via explicit firewall rules
  • Each tenant segment MUST have its own DHCP scope

5. Platform Segment #

The platform segment contains shared infrastructure services.

  • Platform segment MUST contain only shared services (DNS, NTP, artifact mirrors, reverse proxy)
  • Platform segment MUST be reachable from management, trusted, tenant, and IoT backend segments
  • Platform segment MUST NOT contain user workloads or tenant applications
  • Platform segment MUST use static DHCP mappings only
  • Platform segment SHOULD be treated as high-trust infrastructure

6. Guest Segment #

The guest segment provides transient network access.

  • Guest segment MUST provide internet access without substrate access
  • Guest segment MUST NOT route to management, storage, or tenant segments
  • Guest segment MUST use dynamic DHCP only (no static mappings)
  • Guest segment MAY enforce bandwidth or time limits

7. IoT Vendor Segment #

The IoT vendor segment is a strict containment zone for vendor-managed devices.

  • IoT vendor segment MUST be fully isolated from all internal segments
  • IoT vendor segment MUST allow outbound internet access only (for vendor cloud)
  • IoT vendor segment MUST NOT have inbound access from any segment
  • IoT vendor segment MUST NOT access management, storage, tenant, or platform segments
  • IoT vendor segment is stricter than the IoT segment β€” devices are assumed compromised

8. IoT Segment #

The IoT segment contains custom-developed embedded devices with controlled firmware. Unlike the IoT Vendor segment, these devices run firmware that is built, managed, and updated through the Deevnet automation pipeline.

  • IoT segment MUST exist when custom-developed embedded devices are present
  • IoT segment MUST be isolated from management segment
  • IoT segment SHOULD allow controlled outbound internet access
  • IoT segment MUST NOT have unrestricted inbound access
  • IoT segment has medium trust β€” devices run controlled firmware but have limited security capabilities

9. IoT Backend Segment #

The IoT backend segment hosts application backends that process IoT data.

  • IoT backend segment MUST accept inbound connections from IoT segment
  • IoT backend segment MAY access platform segment for shared services
  • IoT backend segment MUST NOT access management segment directly
  • IoT backend segment MUST use static DHCP mappings only
  • IoT backend segment SHOULD validate and sanitize all input from IoT devices

Inter-Segment Communication #

Default Policy #

  • All inter-segment traffic MUST be denied by default
  • Allowed traffic MUST be explicitly defined in firewall rules
  • Firewall rules MUST be version-controlled as code

Permitted Flows #

The following inter-segment flows are permitted when explicitly configured:

SourceDestinationCondition
ManagementAnyAlways allowed (for administration)
TrustedMost segmentsAllowed except guest (for user administration)
TrustedStorageRequired for user data access
Compute hostsStorageRequired for storage access
TenantShared servicesExplicit per-service rules
PlatformInternetOutbound for updates and external APIs
IoT BackendPlatformShared service access (DNS, NTP)
IoTIoT BackendSensor data, MQTT publish
IoTInternetOutbound only
GuestInternet gatewayOutbound only

Prohibited Flows #

The following flows MUST NOT be permitted:

  • Guest to any internal segment
  • Tenant to tenant (cross-tenant)
  • IoT to management (unless explicitly required for specific devices)
  • IoT vendor to any internal segment (full containment)
  • IoT backend to management (must go through platform)

DHCP Requirements #

  • Each segment MUST have a dedicated DHCP scope
  • DHCP scopes MUST NOT overlap
  • Management, trusted, storage, platform, and IoT backend segments SHOULD use static DHCP mappings
  • Tenant segments SHOULD use static mappings for known hosts
  • IoT and guest segments MAY use dynamic pools
  • IoT vendor segment MAY use dynamic pools

Trunk Port Native VLAN #

  • Trunk ports MUST use a dedicated blackhole VLAN (VLAN 999) as the native VLAN
  • The blackhole VLAN MUST NOT have a routed interface, subnet, or gateway
  • The blackhole VLAN MUST NOT have DHCP enabled
  • Management traffic on trunk ports MUST be tagged, not native
  • The blackhole VLAN MUST exist in the switch VLAN database at every site

Firewall Zone Principles #

  • Each segment MUST map to a firewall zone
  • Zone rules MUST be explicit and auditable
  • Zone rules MUST be defined as code (router config automation)
  • Changes to zone rules MUST go through version control

Site Independence #

  • Each site MUST implement segmentation independently
  • Segment implementation (VLAN IDs, IP ranges) MAY differ between sites
  • No implicit dependencies between site segments
  • Cross-site communication MUST traverse external routing

Correctness Invariants #

Network segmentation is correct when:

  1. Segment membership is declarative β€” Host segment assignment is defined in inventory, not discovered
  2. Traffic policies are auditable β€” All inter-segment rules exist as code
  3. Trust boundaries are enforced β€” Firewall rules implement the trust hierarchy
  4. Segments are site-scoped β€” No cross-site segment dependencies
  5. Authority is explicit β€” Segment routing is controlled by the core router in production mode
Page last modified: March 17, 2026